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Abstract: The incremental innovations that underly much of modern
economic growth typically involve changes to one or more components
of a complex product. This creates a tension. On the one hand, a
principal would like an agent to contribute innovative components. On
the other hand, ironing out incompatibilities between interdependent
components can be a drain on the principal’s energies. The principal
can conserve her energies by tightly controlling the innovation process,
but this may inadvertently stiﬂe the agent’s incentive to innovate. We
show precisely how this tension between creating knowledge and con-
trolling knowledge shapes organizational forms. The novel concepts
introduced are illustrated with case studies of the ﬂat panel cathode ray
tube industry and Boeing’s recent location decisions.
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Research.Who creates knowledge and who controls it? These are among the most familiar questions of our
age. The myriad issues at stake are brought home by the intensity of recent debates about the scope
of patent policy, by the household familiarity with corporate names such as Microsoft and Celera
Genomics (giants in the ﬁeld of knowledge creation and control), and by the technology-based
economic resurgence of the United States. In an international context, the location of knowledge
creation and control has additional political and economic implications. In developing countries,
there is a sense that rich countries have failed to create knowledge that is appropriate to local
needs. In middle- and even some high-income countries, there is a sense of impinged sovereignty
because knowledge is often controlled by the headquarter operations of foreign multinationals.
Often implicit in these discussions is an assumption that knowledge-based externalities are large
and that one cannot control knowledge without creating it.
Yet knowledge creation and control are not just about grand new technologies. They are equally
about incremental technological progress. Rosenberg’s (1982a) unsung hero of modern economic
growth is the mundane day-to-day of incremental innovation. This is partly captured by such
phrases as Arrow’s (1962a) ‘learning by doing’ and Rosenberg’s (1982b) ‘learning by using’. One
ﬁnds incremental innovation not among lab-coated technicians, but in business enterprises with
their focus on cost-cutting process improvements, quality control, and minor product innovations.
Yet if incremental innovation is so important then a large piece of the economic puzzle is missing.
Absent is a positive theory of the incentives a ﬁrm uses to induce incremental innovation on the
part of its employees and subcontractors. Restated, we do not understand the role of incremental
innovation for the internal organization of the ﬁrm.
Our analysis of these incentives leads us to a theory of organizational forms built on three
elements. The ﬁrst, emphasized by Arrow (1962b) in his seminal work on knowledge markets, is
that there is an inherent uncertainty surrounding knowledge creation. This so limits the contract-
ing environment that it is appropriate to assume that contracts are incomplete. When products are
standardized and production processes routine, it is easy for the ﬁrm to write detailed contracts
governing its relations with employees and subcontractors. However, as Sabel (1994) pointed
out, innovation undermines the very foundations of such contracts precisely because knowledge
creation is about altering products and processes in potentially unpredictable ways.
The second element, also emphasized by Arrow (1962b), is that knowledge is inherently a public
good and hence non-appropriable. Thus, to the extent that a principal engages an agent (be it an
employee or a subcontractor) in active knowledge creation, there is the potential for the agent to
walk away with the jointly created knowledge. This problem is particularly severe in the context
of incremental innovations, which are more and more often the result of collaborative efforts such
as concurrent engineering between ﬁrms and their sub-contractors (Helper, MacDufﬁe, and Sabel,
2000).
The third and ﬁnal element of our paper ﬂows from the fact that incremental innovation is
often embedded in complex, interdependent systems in which an incremental improvement in one
component is not effective unless other components are also modiﬁed. In the simplest case, when
a ﬁrm asks a parts supplier to improve a component, the solution may entail residual incompatib-
ilities with other components of the system, thus forcing the ﬁrm to incur the additional expenses
1associated with bringing other components into line. This interdependence sets up the possibility
that the parts supplier may not internalize all of the ﬁrm’s innovation costs. We model this using
the novel concept of the imperfect substitutability of innovative effort. Imperfect substitutability is a
measure of the costs imposed on one party (the principal or agent) by the innovative efforts of the
other party (the agent or principal).
Consider two examples that highlight different aspects of the imperfect substitutability of
innovative efforts. The ﬁrst example deals with differences between the technical competencies
of the principal and the agent. Florescent lighting systems consist of a ballast and a lamp. The
ballast passes a charge through the electrodes at each end of the lamp. This charge excites the
gas in the lamp which in turn makes the lamp’s phosphor coating glow. While seemingly simple,
this system has been subject to countless incremental changes over the last 40 years. What makes
these changes complicated is the interaction between the ballast on the one hand and the lamp
components (electrodes, gas, and phosphor) on the other. For instance, changes in the ballast that
improve energy efﬁciency typically stress the electrodes, causing delays and ﬂickering on start-up,
darkening of the lamp ends, changes in the colour spectrum, and reduced lamp life.1 Consider a
North American lamp manufacturer who wants to enter European markets. Since we have not yet
introduced any elements that distinguish the principal from the agent, we arbitrarily refer to the
lamp manufacturer as the principal. Europeans are tolerant of start-up delays, but not of energy
inefﬁciency. As a result, the principal engages a European ballast manufacturer (the agent) to help
improve energy efﬁciency. The principal’s technical competence will incline her towards a solution
or blueprint that alters the lamp components in a way that fails to fully recognize how difﬁcult it
will be for the agent to produce a compatible ballast. That is, the principal’s blueprint will tend
to be costly for the agent to implement. Likewise, the agent’s technical competence will incline
him towards a modiﬁcation of the ballast that does not fully recognize the lamp-compatibility
complications this imposes on the principal.
The next example has all the elements of complex, interdependent systems that were featured
in the previous example. In addition, the next example introduces an incentive problem. The agent
develops a number of alternative solutions to an incremental innovation problem, but only reports
the solution that is easiest for him to implement (as opposed to the solution that is easiest for the
principal to implement). Faced with stability problems in the Ford Explorer sports utility vehicle
shortly before its scheduled production date of 1990, Ford engineers considered four alternative
solutions: widening the chassis, lowering the engine, ﬁtting smaller tires, or lowering the tire
pressure. Ford chose the latter ﬁx and recommended a tire pressure well below that suggested by
its tire supplier, Firestone. This worsened fuel economy so that in 1994, Ford instructed Firestone to
redesign the tire with the aim of making it lighter. This was not trivial: Ford wanted an innovative
tire that looked like a truck tire, but handled like a car tire. In 2001, following increasingly
frequent rollover accidents due to tire blowouts, Ford recalled 13 million Firestone tires. In the
much-publicized legal battle that followed, each side insisted that the problem lay with the other
company. Ford claimed that the speciﬁc choices made by Firestone in redesigning the tires were
1See National Lighting Product Information Program (1994) and United States Environmental Protection Agency
(1998).
2to blame and accused Firestone of concealing the associated risks. Firestone blamed Ford for
withholding information about increases to the vehicle weight that reduced tire safety margins
and contended that Ford should have addressed the vehicle’s stability problems directly. At the
various knowledge-creation stages of this process, each party offered a ‘blueprint’ that shifted the
implementation costs onto the other.2
In these examples, there is an incremental innovation that is embedded in a complex or inter-
dependent system in which alterations in one component affect the performance of other com-
ponents. In this environment there are many layers of uncertainty, including uncertainty about the
appropriateperformancetargetsforeachseparatecomponent. Substitutabilitymeasurestheextent
to which the full costs of innovation, including residual incompatibilities to be resolved by the
other party, are internalized by the innovator. If the residual incompatibilities are important then
we say that the innovative efforts of the principal and agent are only ‘imperfectly substitutable’.
Once we acknowledge that the innovative efforts of the principal and the agent are imperfectly
substitutable, it becomes crucial to know who will have the ﬁnal say or control over which innov-
ation is implemented in the event that both parties independently innovate successfully. In this
situation, where there are two solutions on the table, each party prefers ex post control because it
shifts the cost of eliminating residual incompatibilities onto the other party. Thus, as in Aghion
and Tirole (1997), control can be used ex ante as an incentive device to induce innovative effort.
(As we shall see, our notion of substitutability is a development of Aghion and Tirole’s (1997)
notion of congruence.) If the agent has control, he has a greater incentive to innovate so as to
shift residual incompatibility costs onto the principal. Thus, the degree of substitutability is crucial
for thinking about who creates knowledge and who controls it. Provided that substitutability is
sufﬁciently high (residual incompatibilities are sufﬁciently small), the principal has an incentive to
engage an agent in knowledge creation and perhaps even to delegate to the agent control over
how knowledge is used. This reduces the busy principal’s time spent on innovation without
unduly increasing time spent on residual incompatibilities. In hiring the agent, the principal might
commiserate with Irving Berlin (“anything you can do, I can do better”), but will take heed of
Ricardo’s advice by having the agent participate in knowledge creation.
The degree of appropriability is also a determinant of organizational forms. Provided the risk
of appropriability is low, the principal will have an incentive to engage the agent in knowledge
creation. While this last point is not new (see, e.g., Markusen, 2001), it is worth noting that our
notion of appropriability, which is based on the public-goods nature of information, differs from
the hold-up problem described in Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1985), Hart
(1995), and others. Also, we will document some interesting interactions between appropriability
and substitutability that are relevant for thinking about organizational forms.
We believe that the three core elements of our framework — contractual incompleteness,
non-appropriability, and imperfect substitutability — are uniquely important in the context of
day-to-day incremental innovation. The incremental nature of innovation means that the beneﬁts
of a contract governing the increment alone are small. Further, since incremental improvements
2See http://www.safetyforum.com/firestone/ and http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,
128198,00.html.
3to components of an interdependent system almost always involve collaborative efforts, often in
hierarchical settings, the non-appropriability of knowledge and the imperfect substitutability of
innovative efforts are crucial concerns.
As the paper unfolds we will provide a large number of detailed examples drawn from man-
ufacturing. Each of these examples involves puzzles that cannot be understood within existing
frameworks. For example, why is Sony one of the few integrated tv manufacturers and why did
that integration only come in 1997? For another, why did Boeing go to great lengths in order to
separate its headquarters from all of its production facilities and why did Boeing simultaneously
promote its business unit managers within the organizational hierarchy? We will argue that
these and other industrial organization questions can only be answered by reference to notions
of appropriability and especially substitutability, that is, by reference to what it is that determines
who creates knowledge and who controls it.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 sets up the model. Section 2 describes three
organizational forms that come out of our model and that differ in terms of who controls and
who creates knowledge. Section 3 shows how organizational forms affect the incentives to pro-
duce knowledge and sections 4–7 describe how substitutability and appropriability determine the
choice of organizational form. Section 8 embeds the analysis of a single principal and a single agent
into a general equilibrium model in which the number of principals and agents is endogenous as
are their outside options. Section 9 concludes.
1. Set-up
We have in mind a situation in which a ﬁrm with an existing product sets out to improve it
with an incremental process or product innovation. We use the term innovation in its broadest
sense to include, for example, a marketing innovation. We model this situation as a principal
p (she) who engages an agent a (he) to help her develop and implement a blueprint for this
incremental innovation. Let us begin by introducing the innovation process, before we turn to
describing the complete sequence of events, the contracting environment, and the possible choices
of organizational form.
To capture the idea of imperfect substitutability in its simplest form, innovation is modelled
as a two-stage process. In the ﬁrst stage an incremental innovation is developed and codiﬁed in
a blueprint. This amounts to ﬁnding a solution to an incremental innovation problem. Finding
such a solution requires creative effort from one and possibly both parties. In the second stage the
blueprint is implemented. This amounts to adapting existing components to the solution found.
It requires implementation effort from one and possibly both parties. In practice, the distinction
between the two stages is not hard and fast. The ﬁrst stage typically does not provide a complete
blueprint so that the second stage also involves some amount of effort that with certainty will
4eliminate the ﬁnal bugs.3, 4
Let ei (i = p,a) be the time i spends on creative effort. Let 1 − si be the time i spends on
implementation effort. We also allow for the empirically likely possibility that the knowledge
gained from research helps one eliminate the ﬁnal bugs in the implementation stage. Let ei(1− si)
be the reduction in time spent on implementation effort given that time ei has already been spent
on creative effort. Each actor is endowed with one unit of time so that leisure is given by
li = 1− [ei + (1− si) − ei(1− si)] (1)
= (1− ei)si . (2)
This captures in the simplest terms the way in which effort translates into time. It is worth noting
that, while this is a particularly convenient parameterization of how effort translates into loss of
leisure time, more general parameterizations (e.g., having non-unitary coefﬁcients in front of each
of the terms ei, (1− si), and −ei(1− si)) yield qualitatively the same results.5





where yi is i’s income and P is the relevant price index, which we will take as numéraire. Thus,
preferences over goods are homothetic and the utility derived from purchased goods is propor-
tional to the leisure time one has to enjoy those goods.6.
Creative effort by i (i = p,a) translates into one or more blueprints with probability ei and into
no blueprint with probability 1 − ei.7 All blueprints yield the same total proﬁt or real income so
that they are distinguished only by the amount of effort required from each party to implement
them.
Suppose that the principal has developed at least one blueprint. Then the principal’s preferred
blueprint from among the set of all blueprints she has developed will be the one with the smallest
3The main difference between creative and implementation effort is that there is much greater uncertainty regarding
the outcome of creative effort. One may work hard at trying to come up with a solution to a problem without ﬁnding
one. However, once a solution is found, ﬁxing the ﬁnal bugs may take more or less effort but can certainly be done.
4Notice that all inputs into the knowledge creation process are measured in terms of effort — there are no interme-
diate inputs or non-effort primary inputs. One could introduce intermediate inputs into the innovative process as in
Duranton and Puga (2001). However, this would simply raise a series of general equilibrium interactions that are well
understood and would distract us from the main focus of this paper.
5We can be precise about what we mean by ‘qualitative.’ Without anticipating our results too much, we basically
show that there is a parameter space, say [0,1], such that each organizational form lives uniquely on an interval (αj,αj+1)
in [0,1]. The choice of functional form does not affect the existence of organizational forms nor the ordinal ranking of
the αj. It only affects the cardinal values of the αj. (We do not use this cardinal information.) This is what we mean
throughout the paper when we mention that much more general speciﬁcations yield qualitatively the same results.
6For instance, the principal may use her income to buy a fancy mansion, season opera tickets, or a Ferrari. If she
chooses to work very hard, putting lots of effort into developing and implementing a blueprint, she will spend many
evenings and weekends in the ofﬁce. As a result, she will have little chance to enjoy her mansion, will frequently
miss operas, and the Ferrari will mostly gather dust in the garage. Note that this speciﬁc choice of preferences is
not important for our qualitative results. What matters is that preferences are weakly separable so that we can study
decisions regarding effort by the principal and the agent independently of their consumption choices.
7Note that i’s probability of success is independent of j’s creative effort. This is not important. We could also assume
that i’s probability of success increases with j’s creative effort, as long as this type of complementarity does not dominate
our core notion of imperfectly substitutable creative efforts. We can easily make this statement about dominance precise,
but there is little point in doing so because the focus of our paper is on incremental knowledge creation and not on the
sort of high-tech research in which complementarities are important.
5implementation costs for her. We assume that the implementation costs of the principal’s preferred
blueprint are higher for the agent than for the principal. Likewise for the blueprint that the
agent prefers from among the set of blueprints he has developed: implementation costs of the
agent’s preferred blueprint are higher for the principal than for the agent. To formalize this,
without loss of generality we normalize implementation effort required by i to implement i’s own
blueprint by setting it to 0. In addition, we simplify by setting i’s implementation effort equal
to (1 − ei)(1 − s) for the case where i is implementing j’s blueprint (i 6= j). That is, we assume
that it is equally difﬁcult for the agent and for the principal to implement each other’s blueprint
and that the required implementation effort is decreasing in the match-speciﬁc parameter s. Given
this parameterization, s is a measure of the degree of substitutability of creative efforts. The larger is s,
the more substitutable is creative effort. Under this parameterization our notion that each party’s
preferred blueprint shifts the implementation effort to the other party is simply 0 < (1−ei)(1−s),





(1− ei) if i’s blueprint is implemented,
(1− ei)s if j’s blueprint is implemented.
(4)
For strictly positive leisure, we require s > 0. In combination with the previous restriction, this
implies that s ∈ (0,1).
A. Timing
Having described the innovation process, we can now explain the complete sequence of events.
This sequence of events starts when the principal costlessly matches with an agent whose innovat-
ive effort is broadly substitutable for her own.8 However, the exact degree of substitutability is not
known by either party until they have signed a contract governing their relationship and began
working together. That is, the principal and agent initially know only the distribution from which
s is drawn and not the actual value of s.
Upon matching (but before substitutability is revealed) the pair writes a state-contingent con-
tract that speciﬁes the payment that the agent will receive, conditional on production, under each
organizational form. Organizational forms are distinguished by two aspects. First, by whether or
not the agent is involved in blueprint development. Second, if the agent is involved in blueprint
development, by whether it is the principal or the agent who controls the choice of the blueprint
to be implemented in the event that several blueprints are developed.
After the state-contingent contract is signed, the principal and the agent start working together,
thus revealing the degree of substitutability of their innovative efforts. The principal then chooses
the organizational form. If the principal asks the agent to become involved in knowledge creation,
the agent can refuse (in which case only the principal is involved in blueprint development and
the agent merely implements any blueprint developed by the principal).
8The assumption that matching is costless is innocuous. For one, matching costs may be modelled as a ﬁxed cost
that has no marginal implications once a principal and agent are matched. It will have general equilibrium implications,
but these are not complicated. For another, costly matching adds nothing to the analysis that has not otherwise been
examined in the context of organizations (e.g., by McLaren, 2000; Grossman and Helpman, 2002; Helsley and Strange,
2002). It is therefore an unnecessary complication.
6Once the organizational form is set, the principal, as well as the agent when the organizational
form involves him in knowledge creation, decide how much creative effort to put into trying to
come up with a blueprint. If one or more blueprints are generated, the choice of which blueprint to
implementismadebythepartyassignedcontroloverthatchoiceundertherelevantorganizational
form. Whenever a blueprint is created and implemented, production takes place and operational
proﬁts are used to make the payments speciﬁed in the contract. Each party can at that point take
the other party to court and claim a larger share of the proﬁts. If no blueprint is created, then there
is no production.9
B. The contracting environment
As stated above, upon matching (but before the degree of substitutability of their creative efforts
is revealed) principal and agent write a contract contingent on contractable information. Not all
information in the model is contractable. Most signiﬁcantly, a contract cannot be contingent on any
aspect of the blueprint for the innovation. These aspects are the technical information contained
in the yet-to-be-developed blueprint, whether the blueprint is workable, and who developed the
blueprint in the case where both parties contributed innovative effort. The contractual incom-
pleteness is motivated by the uncertainties associated with knowledge creation in settings where
innovation involves the incremental improvement of a component part of an interdependent
system. The parties cannot contract on the blueprint that will eventually be developed since, by
deﬁnition, the blueprint is new knowledge and therefore unknown to the parties at the time of
writing the contract. Also, the parties cannot contract on the blueprint because, if the principal
asks the agent to help her in knowledge creation, then an outside party such as a court is unable to
disentangle the relative contribution of each party’s innovative effort to the ﬁnal blueprint. Also,
as is standard, effort is neither observable nor contractable.10
This leaves only four pieces of information upon which to contract. These are (1) whether the
agent is involved in knowledge creation, (2) whether, when multiple blueprints are developed, the
principal retains or delegates control over which blueprint to implement, (3) whether production
occurs, and (4) whether payments are made. By ‘organizational form’ we mean aspects of the
contract that deal with knowledge creation (item 1) and knowledge control (item 2). The contract
that the principal and the agent sign upon matching states does not specify the organizational
form (this will only be chosen by the principal, subject to acceptance by the agent, once they
start working together and the actual degree of substitutability is revealed). Instead they sign
a state-contingent contract that speciﬁes the payment that the agent will receive, conditional on
production, under each organizational form.
9Given that all blueprints are equally proﬁtable, we can study the choice of organizational form separately from
production decisions. Thus, we leave the speciﬁcation of production decisions for the penultimate section.
10Note that we are asserting rather than proving that contractual incompleteness ﬂows from the context of the
problem. For a foundational analysis of incomplete contracts see for example the debate involving Maskin and Tirole
(1999), Hart and Moore (1999) and Segal (1999). See also Anderlini and Felli (1994).
7C. Organizational choice
Afterthestate-contingentcontractissignedtheprincipalandtheagentstartworkingtogether, thus
revealing the degree of substitutability of their innovative efforts.11 The principal then chooses
the organizational form. There are two aspects to this choice of organizational form. First, the
principal must decide whether or not to engage the agent in knowledge creation i.e., in blueprint
development. Second, the principal must decide ex ante whether to retain or to delegate to the
agent the choice of blueprint in the event that several blueprints are developed. The ﬁrst decision
is about who creates knowledge. The second is about who controls knowledge.
The principal is distinguished from the agent only by her authority to make these two decisions.
The question of who has this authority typically ﬂows naturally form the situational context (e.g.,
a manager can set the tasks and responsibilities of a subordinate employee while the reverse is not
true). It also ﬂows from the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint. The principal can ask the
agent to engage in the creation and control of knowledge, but the agent has the right to refuse. We
will show that the incentive compatibility condition ensuring that the agent agrees implies that
the principal must have higher income than the agent. In practice, both considerations (position
within an organization and incentive compatibility) are closely related: greater authority over the
allocation of tasks within an organization goes hand in hand with higher earnings. Thus, despite
the symmetry between the two parties in other respects, we will show that incentive compatibility
means that roles cannot be reversed.
There are two additional constraints on the contracted payments to be considered. One of these
is that the payments under each organizational form must be such that both parties prefer the
contract to an outside option. This option takes the form of alternative occupations that will be
introduced when we turn to general equilibrium modelling. Thus, in general equilibrium the
opportunities available to the principal and the agent affect the size of the contracted payments via
their individual rationality constraints. An additional incentive compatibility issue is that these
payments are also affected by the appropriability of knowledge: when the agent is involved in
knowledge creation his payment must reﬂect what he and the principal expect to get if either one
takes the other party to court over the knowledge created. We now develop this latter issue.
D. Knowledge creation and appropriability
If the principal involves the agent in knowledge creation, then there is potentially an appropriability
problem. Consider two scenarios. On the tacit knowledge side, if the agent is involved in know-
ledge creation then he will learn key non-codiﬁable knowledge that cannot be incorporated into
any blueprint. The principal’s innovation decisions will also reveal to a closely-involved agent
many details of the principal’s market strategies. As a result, once involved in knowledge creation
the agent will be able to exploit jointly created knowledge in a way that denigrates the principal’s
11This sets up the potential for an interesting dynamic. The principal and agent may wish to start with smaller projects
or projects with less uncertainty about s and then, over time, consider more complex projects. We hope to examine this
issue in future research.
8proﬁts.12 On the legal side, if both parties are involved in knowledge creation then the agent may
be able to make a credible claim in court that he came up with the crucial ideas. It is remarkably
difﬁcult for the principal to prevent a successful court challenge, even in settings where the facts
and legal issues are clear.13 A fortiori the problems are more severe in our incremental knowledge
setting.
For simplicity, we model the appropriability problem as a possible court challenge that may
be initiated by either party after production (which requires involvement by both) takes places.
More speciﬁcally, we capture this appropriability with a parameter λ that is the probability a court
awards the operational proﬁts π to the agent if such a court challenge takes place. It follows that if
the agent is involved in knowledge creation then the agent must be paid λπ. If the agent receives
less than this then the risk-neutral agent can do better by taking the case to court and receiving
an expected return of λπ. If the agent receives more than λπ then the principal receives less
than (1 − λ)π. It follows that the risk-neutral principal can do better by taking the case to court
and receiving an expected return of (1 − λ)π. It is possible that the agent gains additional tacit
knowledge or credibility in court when he has control over the choice of blueprints. We allow for
this possibility below by having an appropriability risk parameter λ for the case of no control and
a parameter λ0 (λ0 > λ) for the case of control. We start with the simpler case in which λ0 = λ.
Finally, if the agent is not involved in knowledge creation, then he cannot claim he came up with
the crucial ideas and this court challenge is not an option.14
12One way for the principal to partially prevent non-appropriability is by means of a restrictive covenant stating
that if the principal-agent relationship is terminated, the agent will not then compete directly with the principal.
However, such covenants are illegal in many jurisdictions (including California, under Section 16600 of the Business
and Professions Code). Even where they are legal, they are generally not enforceable unless (1) they are sufﬁciently
limited in scope and duration (e.g., one year under Section 36 of the Austrian Employee’s Act), (2) they adequately
compensate the employee (e.g., Article 2125 of the Italian Civil Code), and (3) they impose limited penalties for breach
of contract (e.g., a maximum of twelve month’s salary in France). See Thiébart (2001).
13The controversy over the discovery of streptomycin is illustrative. In 1939 microbiologist Selman Waksman dis-
covered that soil microbes known as actinomyces produce substances that destroy other microbes. He named these
substances ‘antibiotics.’ After developing a method to systematically search for antibiotics, he hired a team of lab assist-
ants to implement it. This systematic search lead Waksman to the discovery of 22 antibiotics, including streptomycin
which in 1944 became the ﬁrst effective treatment against tuberculosis. In 1949 Albert Schatz, who had been involved in
the discovery of streptomycin as a student lab assistant, successfully sued Waksman for a share of the royalties. Schatz’s
legal success came despite the fact that Waksman had been studying actinomyces for over 30 years, had devised the
technical procedure that led to the discovery (for which he received the Nobel Prize), had hired Schatz as a salaried
lab assistant, had identiﬁed many other antibiotics both before and after he met Schatz, and 28 years earlier had even
isolated the actinomycete responsible for streptomycin. In contrast, Schatz had been involved in the project for just a few
months prior to the discovery and had made no other major contribution to medical research. See Wainwright (1990).
Even in this apparently clear-cut case, the principal was unable to prevent the agent from appropriating the knowledge
created i.e., from claiming a share of the proﬁts.
14It is worth noting how our framework differs from the standard principal-agent problem with unobserved agent
effort. There, if one assumes that both actors are risk neutral (as we do here), the principal can get the agent to
fully internalize the effects of his effort decision with an endogenously chosen payment scheme that depends on the
effort-related outcome. However, in our setting of incremental knowledge creation, the unobservability of effort is only
one component. An equally important component is that it is not possible to determine whether the agent’s effort
contributed to the development of the blueprint.
9Organizational form Short name Agent creates knowledge Agent controls knowledge
Implementation form I form No (ea = 0) No
Knowledge form K form Yes (ea > 0) No
Control form C form Yes (ea > 0) Yes
Note: In all 3 forms, the principal creates knowledge (ep > 0).
Table 1. The three organizational forms
E. Knowledge control and substitutability
Havingdecidedtoinvolvetheagentinknowledgecreation, theprincipalmustalsodecidewhether
toretaincontrolovertheuseoftheknowledgecreatedortodelegatecontroltotheagent. Controlis
deﬁned as the right to choose whose blueprint will be implemented in the event that the principal
and the agent come up with competing speciﬁcations. As in Aghion and Tirole (1997), control is
an incentive device to induce innovative effort in settings where monetary incentives are insuf-
ﬁcient.15 Control is an effective incentive because of the imperfect substitutability of innovative
efforts. Suppose that there are two alternative blueprints, one designed by the principal and the
other designed by the agent. Our key assumption is that if the principal develops a blueprint
for an incremental innovation, then the interdependence between components requires the agent
to make some changes in response. As a result, the principal’s blueprint shifts the problem of
residual incompatibilities onto the agent. Likewise, the agent’s blueprint shifts the problem of
residual incompatibilities onto the principal. Recall that the ﬂuorescent light and Ford-Firestone
examples were intended to show that our key imperfect-substitutability assumption reﬂects the
realities of day-to-day incremental innovation.
2. Organizational forms
Variations in the degree of substitutability and appropriability generate three distinct organiza-
tional forms that are distinguished by whether the agent is involved in knowledge creation and, if
so, whether the agent has control over knowledge. Table 1 provides a schematic. We now review
these organizational forms in detail.
A. The implementation-form organization (I form)
In the implementation form organization (‘I form’ for short), the principal does not engage the
agent in knowledge creation i.e., ea = 0. Rather, the principal develops the blueprint and has it
implemented by the agent (i.e., the agent sorts out the ﬁnal bugs). Conditional on production the
15In Aghion and Tirole (1997), monetary incentives do not work because the agent is assumed to be inﬁnitely risk-
averse. In our setting, the agent is risk neutral and does respond to monetary incentives. However, the difﬁculty of
identifying the relative contribution of each party to incremental knowledge creation raises an appropriability risk. This
appropriability risk constrains what the principal pays the agent once involved in knowledge creation. On the one hand,
it forces the principal to pay the agent enough that the agent gets involved in knowledge creation and does not to walk
away with the knowledge gained. On the other hand, it constrains the distribution between the parties of the beneﬁts of
a successful innovation and thus limits the extent to which the principal can induce innovative effort by the agent with
monetary incentives alone.
10principal pays the agent some amount wI
a and is left with π − wI
a. The level of operational proﬁts
π and its division between wI
a and π − wI
a are endogenized in the penultimate section where we
introduce the free-entry conditions for principals and agents. The principal’s problem is to choose





p = (π − wI
a)ep(1− ep) . (5)
The principal develops a blueprint with probability ep and, since it is her blueprint, all implement-
ation costs are borne by the agent. Thus, the principal’s leisure is 1 − ep and the agent’s leisure is




If no blueprint is developed, which happens with probability 1 − ep, there is no production
and income levels are zero. This raises two issues that apply to all organizational forms. First,
we are presuming that production is always preferred to no production. This follows from and
is the purpose of our assumption that s > 0. Second, it would be of interest to introduce a ﬁxed
production cost that must be incurred independent of the outcome of research e.g., a factory must
be built or the agent must be compensated even if there is no production. However, this ﬁxed cost
does not alter our conclusions and only adds another parameter to keep track of. We therefore
assume that there are no ﬁxed costs other than the blueprint requirement itself.
The solution to (5) is trivial (ep = 1/2). For future reference, denote the equilibrium creative
effort levels under the I form by
eI
p = 1/2 and eI
a = 0 . (7)
B. The knowledge-form organization (K form)
In the knowledge-form organization (‘K form’ for short), the principal engages the agent in know-
ledge creation (ea > 0), but retains control over the choice of blueprints. Involving the agent in
knowledge creation leads to a risk of appropriability which, as discussed above, leaves the agent
with income λπ and the principal with income (1 − λ)π. In the event that both parties come up
with a blueprint, the principal will choose to have her own blueprint implemented. This shifts the
implementation costs onto the agent.





p = ep(1− λ)π(1− ep) + (1− ep)ea(1− λ)π(1− ep)s
= (1− λ)π[ep + (1− ep)eas](1− ep) .
(8)
That is, with probability ep the principal develops a blueprint, receives income (1 − λ)π and has
leisure time of 1 − ep. With probability (1 − ep)ea the principal fails to develop a blueprint, but
the agent succeeds, thus leaving the principal with income (1 − λ)π and leisure (1 − ep)s. s < 1
captures the cost to the principal of implementing the agent’s blueprint. Correspondingly, the





a = λπ[eps + (1− ep)ea](1− ea) . (9)




















C. The control-form organization (C form)
In the control-form organization (‘C form’ for short), the principal engages the agent in knowledge
creation and delegates control over the choice of blueprints to the agent. It follows from the
discussion of the K form that if the agent develops a blueprint, it is the agent’s blueprint that





p = (1− λ)π[eas + (1− ea)ep](1− ep) , (12)





a = λπ[ea + (1− ea)eps](1− ea) . (13)




















We next turn to investigating how the levels of creative effort depend on the degree of substitutab-
ility s and the organizational form.
3. The role of control
Thechoiceoforganizationalformbytheprincipalaffectstheextentofknowledgecreation(creative
effort) by both the principal and the agent. Comparison of equations (7), (11), and (15) yields the
following relationship between creative effort levels and organizational forms.
































Figure 1. Creative effort reaction functions
As we move from the I form through the K form to the C form, the principal’s creative effort falls
and the agent’s creative effort rises. That is, the principal replaces her creative effort with that of
the agent’s.
Figure 1 illustrates lemma 1 by plotting the K-form and C-form reaction functions (equations
10 and 14) as well as the equilibrium creative effort levels of the principal and agent (equations
7, 11, and 15). Under the I form, the agent is not involved in knowledge creation (eI
a = 0) and
the principal must exert a high level of creative effort (eI
p = 1/2). Under the K form, the agent
does some of the blueprint development (eK
a > 0), thus allowing the principal to cut back on her
creative effort levels. Under the C form, the principal uses even more of the agent’s creative effort
as a substitute for her own. Why does delegating control induce the agent to exert more creative
effort? Having control allows one to choose one’s own blueprint, thereby shifting the burden of
implementation onto the other party. This raises the returns to successfully developing a blueprint.
In particular, when control is shifted from the principal to the agent the returns to creative effort
rise for the agent and fall for the principal. As a result, the principal is able to replace her own
creative effort with that of the agent’s. Note that this central insight regarding the role of control
in inducing effort ﬁrst appeared in Aghion and Tirole (1997).
The analysis of lemma 1 holds s ﬁxed. We may also inquire as to the effects of our key
substitutability parameter s on the choice of effort.












= 0 i = p,a .
The less substitutable is creative effort (i.e., the smaller is s), the greater is the downside risk
of having to implement the other party’s blueprint. This induces greater creative effort by both
parties. Lemmas 1–2 are interesting features of equilibrium creative effort that feed into our main
results about the choice of organizational form.
4. The organizational choice
The principal chooses the organizational form that yields the highest utility, subject to the agent’s
participation constraint. Plugging in the Nash effort levels of equations (7), (11) and (15) into the
principal’s expected utility functions of equations (5), (8) and (12) yields the following values for
expected utility (with expectation taken over the probability of developing a blueprint):
EUI
















It is mathematically convenient to re-write these equations by dividing through by
(1−λ)π
4 . Denot-





p (j = I,K,C) yields:
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α is the principal’s income when the agent is not involved in knowledge creation divided by
the principal’s income when the agent is involved in knowledge creation. α thus measures the
monetary cost of appropriability risk for the principal. (We use α for appropriability). Inspection of
equation (17) makes it clear that the principal’s choice of organizational form depends on just two
key parameters, substitutability s and appropriability α.
Figure 2 plots the V
j
p against s and α. Within a panel, the V
j
p are plotted against the s. Across
panels, the V
j
p are plotted against the α in the sense that α rises as one moves from case 1 through
to case 3. Consider the upper panel. The VK
p and VC
p curves are upward sloping and intersect only
once. The intersection occurs at s2. To the left of s2 the K form is preferred over the C form while
to the right of s2 the C form is preferred over the K form. Whether the I form is preferred depends
14on the value of α. The top panel of ﬁgure 2 (case 1) illustrates the case where α is sufﬁciently small
that the relevant intersection is between VI
p and VK
p . This occurs at s3(α). To the left of s3(α) the I
form is preferred.16 For somewhat larger values of α (case 2), the relevant intersection is between
VI
p and VC
p and occurs at s1(α). To the left of s1(α) the I form is preferred. For very large values of
α (α > α1 in ﬁgure 2), VI
p lies everywhere above VK
p and VC
p so that the I form is always preferred.
Figure 2 is core to the paper and illustrates how the choice of organizational form depends on our two critical
parameters, the degree of substitutability (s) and the degree of appropriability (α).
At the risk of being pedantic, we formalize the discussion of ﬁgure 2 with a couple of deﬁnitions
and a proposition. This formalization brings home just how simple is the closed-form analysis.
Deﬁnition 1 (Critical degrees of substitutability)




2(4−α) be the value of s that equates VI
p = VC
p .
2. Let s2 ≡ 1 √
2 be the value of s that equates VK
p = VC
p .
3. Let s3(α) ≡
2(α−1)
2−α be the value of s that equates VI
p = VK
p .
Note that s2(= 1/
√
2) is independent of the risk of appropriation. However, as we shall see when
we generalize the model, this last feature is an artifact of our simplifying assumptions rather than
a robust result.
Deﬁnition 2 (Critical degrees of appropriability)
1. Let α1 ≡ 3
2 be the value of α that satisﬁes s1(α) = 1.





2 ' 1.26 be the value of α that satisﬁes s2 = s3(α).
The next proposition is organized using the cases displayed in ﬁgure 2. It is best understood by
referring back to the ﬁgure.
Proposition 1 (Determinants of organizational form)
Case 1. If α < α2 (low appropriability costs) then the principal chooses the I form whenever s ∈
(0,s3(α)), the K form whenever s ∈ (s3(α),s2), and the C form whenever s ∈ (s2,1).
Case 2. If α ∈ (α2,α1) (moderate appropriability costs) then the principal chooses the I form whenever
s ∈ (0,s1(α)) and the C form whenever s ∈ (s1(α),1).
Case 3. If α > α1 (high appropriability costs) then the principal always chooses the I form.
Proposition 1 is our core result. Before investigating the economics of this proposition let us brieﬂy
discuss incentive compatibility.
While it is the principal who offers to engage the agent in the creation and control of knowledge,
the agent can always refuse. The organizational choice of proposition 1 holds provided that
the agent is willing to engage in knowledge creation and control whenever the principal asks
him to do so. That is, incentive compatibility requires that min(EUK
a ,EUC
a ) > EUI
a whenever
16We will show shortly that incentive compatibility implies α > 1 which in turn implies that α can never be so low as













































Figure 2. Determinants of organizational forms
16min(EUK
p ,EUC
p ) > EUI
p. A necessary and sufﬁcient condition for this to hold for all s is wI
a/π ≤
2λ/3.17,18
The incentive compatibility constraint implies that the roles of the principal and the agent
cannot be reversed despite their apparent symmetry. To see this, note that incentive compatibility
is more easily satisﬁed the lower is wI
a/π because this makes involvement in knowledge creation
more attractive to the agent. By involving the agent in knowledge creation, the principal is trading
off income for leisure while the agent is trading off leisure for income. This will only be worthwhile
for both parties if the principal is a sufﬁciently higher income earner in the absence of agent
involvement in knowledge creation i.e., if wI
a/π is low. Thus, the principal is the one who wants
to exchange income in return for leisure and the agent is the one who wants to exchange leisure in
return for income.
5. Organizational choice: determinants and co-existence
There are a number of ways to interpret proposition 1. One is as a description of how sub-
stitutability s and appropriability α determine the choice of organizational form. In this sense,
the proposition offers a comparative static involving s and α. Another way to think about the
proposition is as a statement about the co-existence of organizational forms. We turn to these
interpretations now.
A. The role of substitutability as a determinant of organizational choice
Acoreinnovationofourpaperisinidentifyingsubstitutabilityofcreativeefforts s asadeterminant
of organizational choice. The next corollary uses friendlier language to draw out this implication
from proposition 1.
Corollary1.1(Substitutabilityandorganizationalchoice) Anincreaseinthedegreeofsubstitutability
between the creative efforts of the principal and the agent (i.e., an increase in s) can lead to a change in
organizationalform. Incase1, as s risesfrom0to1theorganizationalformchangesfromtheimplementation
form to the knowledge form and then to the control form. In case 2, the organizational form changes from
the implementation form to the control form.
To investigate the empirical relevance of this corollary we present the case of the cathode
ray tube (crt). The crt lies at the heart of colour tvs. As illustrated in ﬁgure 3, it consists
17To derive this expression, substitute equations (7), (11), and (15) into the agent’s expected utility expressions of (6),
(9), and (13) and compare the result with the principal’s expected utilities expressions of (16). It will be immediately
apparent that min(EUK
a ,EUC
a ) > EUI
a whenever min(EUK
p ,EUC
p ) > EUI
p as long as EUI
a 6 EUC
a for s = 1. This yields
the condition wI
a/π ≤ 2λ/3.
18It is now easy to show that the intervals involving the sj(α) in proposition 1 are well deﬁned. In case 2, it is easy
to show that α ∈ (α2,α1) implies 0 < s1(α) < 1. Simply plug in the deﬁnitions of α2, α1, and s1(α). In case 1, it is easy
to show that s2 < 1 and that α < α2 implies s3(α) < s2. Again, plug in the deﬁnitions of α2, s3(α), and s2. To show
s3(α) > 0 note from the deﬁnition of s3(α) and α that s3 > 0 if and only if α > 1. But α > 1 follows from rearranging the
incentive compatibility condition wI
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Figure 3. Section of a cathode ray tube
of an electron gun that bombards the phosphor-coated inner surface of the glass panel, causing
phosphors coloured in red, green, and blue to glow and produce a colour image (see Alig, 1999,
for more details). Accurately targetting the inner surface of the glass panel with electrons is tricky.
This is the job of the deﬂection yokes (which create a magnetic ﬁeld that forces the electron beams
to scan across the glass panel surface) and the sophisticated, pattern-forming mask (which shapes
the electron beams). The surface must be accurately targeted both in terms of location (which
determines the focus or vividness of the image) and in in terms of intensity (which determines the
brightness of the image).
The electron gun and phosphor-coated surface sit inside a vacuum glass tube. The tube must
meet three main requirements. First, it must be strong enough to withstand the vacuum pressure.
Second, the front panel of the tube must have a thickness that is substantially uniform so as not to
distort the image as it passes through the glass. Third, since the phosphor-coated surface sits up
against the front panel, the panel must have a shape that is easily targeted by the electron gun.
In the high end of the North American crt market, there are only eight crt manufacturers
(e.g., Sony) supplied by four glass manufacturers (e.g., Techneglass). Both the glass and crt
manufacturers routinely improve their components. Because the electronic and glass components
are interdependent, changes in one component invariably require custom changes in the others.
Despite the required customization of glass tubes, the relationships between glass and crt manu-
facturers were both arms-length and stable throughout the 1980s and the ﬁrst half of the 1990s.
In the early 1990s there was a change in the industry that might be viewed as a natural ex-
periment. Incremental improvements in crts had reached the point where ﬂat-screen displays
were feasible, though expensive. The ﬂat screen created a host of new technical problems. (For
a discussion, see us patent 6,121,723.) In particular, it compromised the strength of the glass
tube (curved structures, as in domes, withstand pressure better) and also made it difﬁcult to
ensure that focus and brightness where uniform from edge to edge of the ﬂat screen (in curved
18tubes the edges and the centre of the front panel are more equidistant from the electron gun).
Broadly speaking, there are two solutions to these problems. First, the glass can be made thicker
around the edges in order to strengthen the tube, a practice known as wedging (see, e.g., us patent
5,107,999). Wedging can be seen in the crt of ﬁgure 3. This glass manufacturer’s solution imposes
heavy implementation costs on the crt manufacturer because the variable glass thickness makes
it even more difﬁcult to ensure uniform focus and brightness across the front panel. The crt
manufacturer must therefore make modiﬁcations to the electron gun and the phosphor-coated
surface (see, e.g., us patent 6,307,333). Alternatively, the electron gun can be designed to ensure
edge-to-edge focus and brightness on a uniformly thin front panel (see, e.g., us patent 5,539,285).
This crt manufacturer’s solution imposes heavy costs on the glass manufacturer because it means
that the tube can only be strengthened by more fully exploiting the compressive characteristics
of the glass (see, e.g., us patent 6,353,283). What this means is that the introduction of the new
ﬂat-screen displays sharply reduced substitutability between the creative efforts of the crt and
glass manufacturers. In the notation of our model, s fell.19
According to our model, this exogenous fall in s should have led to a change in organizational
form. Inparticular, thedominantorganizationalform, whichinvolvedout-sourcingthedesignand
production of the glass tube (i.e., the control form), should have given way to the knowledge-form
organization or even the implementation-form organization. This is precisely what happened. The
case of Sony provides a good example. Instead of approaching its traditional glass manufacturers
for a solution, Sony partially integrated its operations in two ways (see Hardison, 1996). First,
it initiated a joint venture with Corning-Asahi, called American Video Glass (avg), which was
mandated to design and produce a glass tube with a uniformly thin front panel. Sony’s control
over avg is evident from the fact that avg was located inside Sony’s Pittsburgh production facility.
The avg arrangement thus has features of both the knowledge- and implementation-form organ-
izations. Second, Sony continued to out-source glass tubes from its existing suppliers, such as
Techneglass. This out-sourcing arrangement is essentially an implementation-form organization.
Thus, corollary 1.1 correctly predicts developments in the organizational form of this industry.
Finally, it isworthpointingoutthat moretraditionalexplanationsforvertical integrationarenot
relevant here. For one, Sony’s avg arrangement was not about concentrating different stages of the
tv production process in one site: avg was set up to supply Sony’s San Diego production facility,
not Sony’s Pittsburgh production facility where it was located. For another, the usual hold-up
explanation (e.g., Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1985; Hart, 1995) is not relevant here either. First,
Sony and all other crt manufacturers had a long history of ordering custom glass tubes from
outside suppliers. Despite the potential for hold-up that custom tubes entail, out-sourcing of
tubes was pervasive and stable throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (before ﬂat-screen displays
appeared). Second, throughout this long period, Sony bought from three of the four main glass
tube suppliers and these suppliers appear to have freely applied knowledge developed for Sony to
19All of these patents protect small incremental improvements to the glass and electronic components of crts. Yet
the existence of these patents has not prevented each manufacturer from ﬁnding slightly different solutions and ﬁling
patent applications over its particular blueprint or implementation of a blueprint. See Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and
Winter (1987) for evidence that in most sectors ﬁrms do not regard patents as an effective means of protecting incremental
innovations, but ﬁle patent applications anyway for a host of other reasons.
19the glass tubes they supplied to Sony’s competitors. (See Helper et al., 2000, for evidence that this
is a common practice among suppliers in many industries.) Third, even after the introduction of
ﬂat-screen displays Sony continued to out-source glass tubes from its existing suppliers, which
suggests that investment speciﬁcity did not become any more of a concern. Fourth, both the
crt and glass manufacturers’ patents cited above clearly state that the introduction of ﬂat screen
displays created technical problems for which there were two types of solutions, each of which
shifted the burden of implementation onto the other party. Finally, we are clearly dealing with the
production of knowledge, which has more of a public-goods character than, say, a Fisher Brothers
automotive body. In short, it seems that the change in organizational form had little to do with
transportationcostsorhold-upandeverythingtodowithareductioninSony’sabilitytosubstitute
its creative effort for that of its glass tube suppliers. That is, we are dealing with a reduction in s.
B. The role of appropriability risk as a determinant of organizational choice
Another innovation of our paper is in identifying an appropriability problem that exploits the
public-goods nature of knowledge. The next corollary uses friendlier language to draw out this
implication from proposition 1.
Corollary 1.2 (Appropriation costs and organizational choice) An increase in the cost of appropriabil-
ity risk for the principal (i.e., an increase in α) pushes the organizational form away from both the knowledge
and control forms towards the implementation form.
To illustrate this point we return to the crts found in colour tvs. There is wide heterogeneity in
the extent to which crt manufacturers involve their suppliers in knowledge creation and control.
For instance, Hitachi out-sources the design and production of its crts. Sony instead designs its
owntubes, producesthekeytechnologicalcomponents, andkeepsatightcontroloverthetechnical
speciﬁcations of the components it out-sources. A key difference between the two manufacturers
is the type of pattern-forming mask that each uses. See ﬁgure 3. Hitachi uses a fairly standard
shadowmaskwhereasSonyusesitsadvanced‘Triniton’aperture-grillemask. Asaresult, Sonyhas
a jump on the ﬁeld and crucial knowledge to hide from manufacturers that have started producing
Trinitronclones. (TheTrinitonpatentjustexpired.) Giventhesedifferencesintheappropriabilityof
mask technology, our model correctly predicts that Hitachi will out-source more of its crt business
than Sony.20
Notice once again how the choice of organizational form is very different from the usual one
(e.g., Klein et al., 1978), including, most recently, Grossman and Helpman (2002). In the usual
setting, there is a relationship-speciﬁc investment and one party can renegotiate for a better deal
knowing that the investment is not worth anything to the other party in the absence of a deal. The
solution is to integrate, possibly incurring additional governance costs. Here integration will not
solve the public goods, knowledge-appropriation problem. The principal has two solutions. She
may set an incentive-compatible payment that prevents the agent from trying to claim ownership
of the knowledge (the K and C forms). Alternatively, the principal may choose not to involve the
20It is worth noting that Sony out-sources much more in lines of business where appropriability issues are not as
important as in its crts.
20agent in knowledge creation (the I form). In either case, the public-goods nature of knowledge is
central.
C. Co-existence of organizational forms
A very different way of thinking about proposition 1 is as a statement about the co-existence of
organizational forms. The idea is that if there are multiple principal-agent matches, each with
an idiosyncratic characteristic (α,s), then we would observe the simultaneous coexistence of up
to three different organizational forms. Such heterogeneity appeared in our discussion of Hitachi
and Sony. In this case, the heterogeneity is induced by differences across ﬁrms in λ and hence
α. In the section on general equilibrium we will consider the existence of multiple matches each
characterized by a different s. We then show that in equilibrium, organizational forms co-exist.
To summarize, proposition 1 contains two novel features. It tells us how organizational forms
vary with the degree of substitutability of creative efforts (s) and with the risk of appropriation (α).
It also predicts that heterogeneity in α or s will lead to the coexistence of organizational forms.
6. Higher appropriability risk with control
In the next two sections we show how easy it is to extend proposition 1 in a number of interesting
and empirically relevant directions. Suppose that the agent is more likely to walk away with the
principal’s idea if he has been delegated control over the implementation of knowledge, perhaps
because control gives the agent additional tacit knowledge or credibility in court. Let λ0 be the
share of proﬁts going to the agent in a C-form organization and let λ continue to denote the agent’s
share in a K-form organization. If the risk of appropriation increases when the agent has control,
then λ0 will exceed λ (although the model can equally accommodate the reverse).
The optimal effort levels are independent of λ0 and λ, as can be seen from equations (7), (11)
and (15). Consequently, this generalization only requires one to change λ to λ0 in the expression
for EUC
p in (16). As a result, VC








From the discussion of ﬁgure 2, all that the introduction of λ0 > λ does is to lower the VC
p curve.
Consequently, the cut-off s2 between the K and C forms, which was a constant 1/
√
2, becomes
dependent on the appropriability parameters λ0 and λ. This provides an additional channel
through which appropriability and control interplay. The cut-off s3 between the I and K forms
is unchanged, while the cut-off s1 between the I and C forms now also depends on λ0 and λ. Thus,
deﬁnitions 1 and 2 generalize as follows.
Deﬁnition 10 (Critical degrees of substitutability with λ0 6= λ)




2[4(1−λ0)−α(1−λ)] be the value of s that equates VI
p = VC
p .











































Figure 4. Co-existence of organizational forms when appropriability risk increases with control
3. Let s3(α) ≡
2(α−1)
2−α be the value of s that equates VI
p = VK
p .
Deﬁnition 20 (Critical degrees of appropriability with λ0 6= λ)
1. Let α1 ≡
3(1−λ0)
2(1−λ) be the value of α that satisﬁes s1(α,λ,λ0) = 1.
2. Let α2 ≡
2+2s2(λ,λ0)
2+s2(λ,λ0) be the value of α that satisﬁes s2(λ,λ0) = s3(α) or, equivalently, s2(λ,λ0) =
s1(α,λ,λ0).
3. Let α3 ≡ 4
3 be the value of α that satisﬁes s3(α) = 1.
The consequences of this generalization for the choice of organizational form can be seen by
comparing ﬁgure 2 (where λ0 = λ) with ﬁgure 4 (where λ0 > λ). Consider case 1. Starting from
λ0 = λ (the top panel of ﬁgure 2), an increase in λ0 lowers the VC
p curve (the top panel of ﬁgure
4). This shifts s2, the cut-off between the K and C forms, to the right. That is, it makes C-form
organizations less likely.
22If one continues to increase λ0 to the point where the VC
p curve lies everywhere below the VK
p
curve (which, by equations 17 and 19 happens when λ0 > 1 − 2λ) then the C form disappears
entirely. See the bottom panel of ﬁgure 4. In this case, matches to the left of s3 adopt the I form
while those to the right of s3 adopt the K form. This case does not happen with λ0 = λ.
Thus, proposition 1 generalizes as follows.
Proposition 10 (Co-existence of organizational forms with λ0 6= λ)
Case 1. If λ0 < 1 − 2λ and α < α2 then the principal chooses the I form whenever s ∈ (0,s3(α)), the
K form whenever s ∈ (s3(α),s2(λ,λ0)), and the C form whenever s ∈ (s2(λ,λ0),1).
Case 2. If λ0 < 1 − 2λ and α ∈ (α2,α1) then the principal chooses the I form whenever s ∈
(0,s1(α,λ,λ0)) and the C form whenever s ∈ (s1(α,λ,λ0),1).
Case 3. If λ0 < 1 − 2λ and α > α1 or if λ0 > 1 − 2λ and α > α3 then the principal always chooses
the I form.
Case 4. If λ0 > 1 − 2λ and α < α3 then the principal chooses the I form whenever s ∈ (0,s3(α)), and
the K form whenever s ∈ (s3(α),1).
7. A busier principal
In March 2001, the Boeing Company announced it was fundamentally changing its organizational
structure. Boeing had three major lines of business, including the famous commercial aircraft
unit co-located with its corporate headquarters in Seattle. Faced with a ﬂat market for commercial
aircraft and limited growth potential elsewhere, Boeing’s corporate management set out to identify
new lines of business. At the same time, corporate managers knew that to remain competitive
they needed to continue delivering incremental innovations in their existing lines of business. To
achieve both ends, Boeing’s corporate management decided to relinquish control over operational
improvements in its existing lines of business. In particular, it promoted the three existing unit
heads to chief executive ofﬁcers and geographically separated the corporate headquarters from all
three business units.21
This is yet another example of a change in organizational form that cannot be explained by
the more conventional approach to organizations that emphasizes hold-up issues. It can however,
be easily understood within our framework simply by introducing one additional parameter that
measures how busy the principal is with other tasks. More generally, this allows us to analyze
21The simultaneous announcement of these two decisions and the explanations given by Boeing’s Chairman at the
newsconferencemadeitclearthattherelocationofBoeing’scorporateheadquarters(toChicago, itwaslaterannounced)
was not just about locating more centrally within the United States; it was mainly a commitment to delegating control
over incremental knowledge creation. (Indeed, centrally-located Saint Louis was not even considered as a potential
headquarter location because it housed Boeing’s military aircraft and missile operations and Boeing’s Chairman felt
that having business units managers down the corridor from him would limit their initiative.) Note that our aim is
not to explain the speciﬁc choice of Chicago over the two other short-listed locations, Dallas/Fort Worth and Denver,
which was made months later (on this respect, see Garcia-Mila and McGuire, 2002). Rather we wish to explain the
decision to separate the corporate headquarters from all business units at the same time as business unit managers
were given greater responsibilities. A recording of Boeing’s news conference of 21 March 2001 is available from http:
//www.boeing.com/news/.
23the effects of managerial overload on the involvement of subordinates in knowledge creation and
control.
So far we have assumed that the principal and the agent have similar demands on their time.
Let us now allow for the possibility that the principal is busier than the agent. The simplest way to
do this is by assuming that the principal has θ units of time less than the agent. For simplicity, we
treat θ as exogenous (in a more complex setting, θ could be endogenized by letting the principal
choose how much time to devote to other tasks). Then the principal’s leisure is lp = [(1− ep)s − θ]
when the agent’s preferred blueprint is implemented and lp = (1 − ep − θ) when the principal’s
own preferred blueprint is implemented. (Our baseline case corresponds to θ = 0.) The agent’s
leisure continues to be la = (1− ea)s when the principal’s preferred blueprint is implemented and
la = (1− ea) when the agent’s own preferred blueprint is implemented.
When the agent is not involved in knowledge creation, the problem faced by the principal now





p = (π − wI
a)ep(1− ep − θ) . (20)
The solution to this yields the principal’s equilibrium creative effort level under the I form as
eI
p = (1− θ)/2 . (21)
Note that eI
p is decreasing in θ: as the principal becomes busier with other tasks, she is less willing
to exert creative effort. This lowers the probability of a blueprint being developed.





p = (1− λ)π{ep(1− ep − θ) + (1− ep)ea[(1− ep)s − θ]} (22)





p = (1− λ)π{ea[(1− ep)s − θ] + (1− ea)ep(1− ep − θ)} (23)
if control is delegated to the agent. The solutions to these yield the reaction functions of the
principal under the K and C forms as
eK
p(ea) =




1− (1+ s)ea − θ(1− ea)
2(1− ea)
, (24)
respectively. The main point to note from these equations is that both eK
p(ea) and eC
p(ea) are
decreasing in θ: as the time spent by the principal on other tasks increases, she is less willing to
exert creative effort for any given level of creative effort by the agent. In other words, an increase in
θ shifts down the principal’s reaction functions under the K and C forms. Figure 5 illustrates this.
(The downwards shift in the principal’s reaction functions can be seen by comparison of ﬁgures 5
and 1.)
The agent’s problem under each organizational form and the agent’s reaction functions when
he is involved in knowledge creation are unaffected by the fact that the principal is busier. (The


























Figure 5. Creative effort reaction functions when the principal is busier
the southeast along his K- and C-form reaction functions. The busy principal puts in less creative
effort while the agent puts in more.
Thus, while there is a direct cost of work overload for the principal in terms of foregone leisure,
she also enjoys a strategic beneﬁt of over-commitment: the principal’s busier schedule commits
her to cutting back on creative effort, thus inducing the agent to work harder. The choice of
organizational form is affected by the relative magnitude of these two effects. When there is low
substitutability between the creative efforts of the principal and the agent (s is low), the direct cost
of over-commitment dominates. On the other hand, when there is high substitutability between
the creative efforts of the principal and the agent (s is high), the strategic beneﬁt of being busy
dominates. To see this, consider a faculty member (a principal) with an idea for a paper. She
engagesaPhDstudent(anagent)todoatleastsomeoftheresearch. Ifthefacultymemberbecomes
involved in another activity that eats up her time (e.g., chairing the recruiting committee), how will
this affect the student’s involvement and the faculty member’s research output? The answer will
depend on the degree of substitutability between the creative efforts of the faculty member and the
student. If the student’s research effort is not very substitutable with the faculty member’s then
the student’s output will be far from a ﬁnished product, the supervisor will not have enough time
to ﬁnish the paper, and the project will be still-born. On the other hand, if the student’s research
effort is very substitutable with the faculty member’s, taking on other commitments can be good
for the supervisor’s research productivity. It induces the student to work harder and the student’s






















Figure 6. Co-existence of organizational forms when the principal is busier
co-authored paper with little time involvement by the faculty member.
Figure 6 graphically illustrates the issues. For low levels of substitutability (low s) the VK
p curve
shifts down, reﬂecting the direct cost of work overload. As a result, the cut-off between the I and K
forms shifts left. Simply put, if substitutability is low then the busy principal either does it herself
or does not do it at all. She will not waste time on large implementation costs. For high levels of
substitutability (high s) the VK
p curve shifts up, reﬂecting the beneﬁt of strategic over-commitment
that forces the agent to work harder. As a result, the cut-off between the K and C forms shifts right.
Simply put, if substitutability is high then the busy principal delegates most aspects of the project.
The transformation of Boeing’s organizational form can be seen as an example of the lat-
ter change. This interpretation ﬁts well with Boeing’s own presentation of the facts. Boeing’s
Chairman emphasized that the aim of promoting business unit managers and relocating the cor-
porate headquarters was to give business unit managers “more freedom to deliver operational
improvements”, thus allowing its corporate managers to “focus on new business opportunities for
Boeing”.22 That is, the aim was to reduce ep and raise ea. Thus, to continue delivering incremental
product improvements (knowledge creation) in the face of greater demands on their time, Boeing’s
corporate managers relinquished control over knowledge creation to business unit managers. In
the terminology of our framework, Boeing’s internal organization changed from the knowledge
form to the control form.
8. General Equilibrium
We have been careful to set up the model so that its general equilibrium aspects are easy to handle.
While general equilibrium interactions are not the main message of this paper, we nevertheless
have several reasons for pursuing them. First and most importantly, this allows us to endogenize
how proﬁts are split between the principal and the agent under the implementation form. This in
22See Boeing’s news release of 21 March 2001 at http://www.boeing.com/news/.
26turn allows us to endogenize the key appropriability parameter α = (π −wI
a)/[(1−λ)π]. Second,
general equilibrium analysis allows us to endogenize the number of principals and agents. Third,
it establishes the uniqueness of equilibrium. Finally, this section shows just how easy it is to use
our model for general equilibrium comparative statics, a subject we will return to in future work.
We have set up the model so that the level of proﬁts of a any given ﬁrm does not affect its
choice of organizational form, while the distribution of these proﬁts between the ﬁrm’s principal
and agent does.23 The focus of our general equilibrium analysis is thus on the effect of outside
opportunities on the equilibrium number of principals and agents and on how proﬁts are split
betweenthemundertheimplementationform. Thisallowsustoendogenizethecostofknowledge
appropriability and the equilibrium organizational forms of different principal-agent matches.
To avoid over-kill, we do not work through all three cases identiﬁed in ﬁgure 2 and proposition
1. Instead, we look at the most complicated case (case 1, with all three organizational forms). The
remaining cases follow trivially.
Each type of actor i (i = p,a) has an alternative opportunity in the ‘nine-to-ﬁve’ sector, that is,
a sector where workers do not exert either creative effort or implementation effort. This leaves
workers in this sector with one unit of leisure. Let w9−5
i be the wage in this sector. With one unit of
leisure, w9−5
i will also measure utility. Each actor must decide whether to work in the nine-to-ﬁve
sector or to match. Matches are characterized by the substitutability parameter s. The probability
of entering a match of type s is described by an arbitrary but known probability density function
f(s) deﬁned over (0,1) and with positive mass throughout this interval. With free entry into either
a match or the nine-to-ﬁve sector, utility and expected utility must be equalized across activities.
Since nine-to-ﬁve sector utility is just w9−5














i f(s)ds , i = p,a (25)
where on the right hand side expectations are taken across different values of s and hence across
utilitiesunderdifferentorganizationalforms. Notethatsincenine-to-ﬁvershavemoreleisuretime,
their incomes must be lower.24
We have not explained what nine-to-ﬁvers do. While there are many options, the simplest for
present purposes is an activity that does not introduce another product market. We thus treat
nine-to-ﬁvers as production line workers who are hired to produce the products described by
blueprints. Further, to distinguish between principals and agents in the simplest way possible, we




23In a paper developed simultaneously to ours, Marin and Verdier (2002) build a general equilibrium framework that
also contains elements drawn from Aghion and Tirole (1997). Other than that, their paper is quite different from ours. In
particular, in Marin and Verdier (2002) the level of ﬁrm proﬁts directly affects the choice of organizational form and their
analysis focuses on comparative statics that affect organizational form by changing this proﬁt level. The organizational
forms they consider also differ from ours since their interest is not in knowledge creation but in market power.
24It is worth noting that, besides endogenizing key variables, our approach in this section illustrates the more general
point that each ﬁrms’ choice of organizational form is affected by the options available to the ‘marginal’ principal or
agent in the economy, which necessarily reﬂect the (general equilibrium) environment in which the ﬁrm operates. See
Legros and Newman (2000).
27The incentive compatibility constraint derived in section 4 implies 0 < φ < 1.
We will need to keep track of the number of principals Lp, the number of agents La, the number
of matches m, and the number of matches that successfully produce blueprints n. Let ρ ≡ n/m be









































where the second line follows from substituting in the expressions for the e
j
i given by equations
(7), (11), and (15).
Finally, we need an expression for proﬁts. Since there are ﬁxed costs of developing a blueprint,
ﬁrms will earn positive operational proﬁts. Let µ(n) be a ﬁrm’s mark-up i.e., (price less marginal
cost)/(price). We assume only that mark-ups fall as the number of producers rises. That is,
dµ(n)/dn 6 0. This is consistent with a large number of market structures.25 Each ﬁrm’s revenue
is a fraction 1/n of total income Y. By the deﬁnition of µ(n), each ﬁrm’s proﬁts will be a fraction
µ(n) of its revenues:
π = µ(n)Y/n . (28)
Total income is the sum of nine-to-ﬁve incomes plus total proﬁts nπ:
Y = (Lp − m)w9−5
p + (La − m)w9−5
a + nπ . (29)
This completes our description of general equilibrium.26
Our primary interest is in endogenizing α = (π − wI
a)/[(1 − λ)π] which is equivalent to
endogenizing ω ≡ wI
a/π. To this end, we can rewrite the equation (25) free entry conditions of the
principal and agent exclusively in terms of just two unknowns, ω and the number of successful
matches n. To do so, ﬁrst note from deﬁnition 1 that s2 = 1/
√
2 and s3 = 2(λ − ω)/(1 − 2λ + ω).
Second, substitute the equation (16) expression for the EU
j
p into the equation (25) free entry condi-

























where g(n,ω) is simply w9−5
p /π expressed as a function of n and ω. It is straightforward to show
that dg(n,ω)/dn > 0 and that dg(n,ω)/dω < 0.27 The corresponding free entry condition for
25Consider two examples. If ﬁrms are monopolistic competitors producing differentiated varieties that enter con-
sumer preferences with a constant elasticity of substitution σ, then µ(n) = 1/σ and dµ(n)/dn = 0. If ﬁrms
are Bertrand oligopolists, again with ces product differentiation, then µ(n) = 1/[σ − (σ − 1)/n] and dµ(n)/dn =
−(σ − 1)/[1+ (n − 1)σ]2 < 0.
26For our purposes it is sufﬁcient to solve for the ratio w9−5
p /π. To solve for w9−5
p and π individually we would need
an additional equation equating w9−5
p to the value of its marginal product.
27Substituting equations (26) and (29) and the deﬁnition of ρ into (28) and solving for w9−5





µ(n){[Lp−n/ρ(λ,ω)]+φ[La−n/ρ(λ,ω)]}. Noting that, with s3 = 2(λ − ω)/(1− 2λ + ω), dρ(λ,ω)/dλ < 0 and dρ(λ,ω)/dω >
0, it is straightforward to see that dg(n,ω)/dn > 0 and dg(n,ω)/dω < 0. Notice that, by (26), w9−5
a /π = φg(n,ω).
28Free entry of agents
ω
n
Free entry of principals


























Equations (30) and (31) jointly characterize the general equilibrium values of the number of
producers (n) and the share of operational proﬁts going to the agent under the I form (ω). As
illustrated in ﬁgure 7, when drawn in {n,ω} space the free entry condition for agents always
slopes upward and has a larger slope than the free entry condition for principals.28 Thus, the
intersection of the two free entry conditions is unique as illustrated in ﬁgure 7.
To summarize our general equilibrium derivations, let us collect our exogenous parameters in
the vector β = {Lp,La,λ,φ} where β ∈ B = {(0,∞)2 × (0,1)2}. The discussion leading up to ﬁgure
7 demonstrates that for each parameter vector β there exists a unique equilibrium with n = n(β)
and ω = ω(β). Since α is a function of ω, this implies a unique α = α(β). Proposition 1 with α set
to α(β) then fully characterizes the co-existence of organizational forms in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (General equilibrium) For each parameter vector β ∈ B there exists a unique general
equilibrium. The types of organizational forms that co-exist and the range of substitutability s for which
each form is adopted are given by proposition 1 with the cost of appropriability α set to α(β).
28These claims about slopes follow from dg(n,ω)/dn > 0, dg(n,ω)/dω < 0, and the fact that the right-hand side of
equation (30) is decreasing in ω whereas the right-hand side of equation (31) is increasing in ω.
29The comparative statics discussed throughout the paper still hold in general equilibrium. We
can also take these comparative statics one level deeper. For instance, we may use equations
(30) and (31) to look at how the risk of appropriation (λ) affects the number of producers (n),
the share of operational proﬁts received by agents under the I form (ω), and the cut-off between
organizational forms (s3).
So far we have taken the distribution of the substitutability parameter f(s) as exogenous. Its
evolution is of course of interest. The dynamic we have in mind is that the larger is the set of
agents involved in knowledge creation and control, the more rapidly agents acquire the skills that
principals are looking for. That is, f(s) becomes skewed to the right over time. This will increase
the proportion of matches that adopt the K and C forms which further reinforces the acquisition of
skills. The result is a knowledge-based externality: by involving workers and subcontractors more
closely in knowledge-based activities today, ﬁrms create an environment that encourages even
more agent participation in knowledge-based activities tomorrow. This will have implications for
growth that we hope to explore in future work.
9. Conclusions
Nate Rosenberg’s unsung hero of economic growth is the mundane day-to-day of incremental
innovation. Yet sustaining incremental innovation within a ’neo-classical ﬁrm’ is difﬁcult for
reasons long ago pointed out by Arrow (1962b): the uncertainty of knowledge creation is as-
sociated with contractual incompleteness and the public-goods nature of knowledge is associated
with non-appropriability. We also identiﬁed the additional problem that incremental innovation is
typically embedded in complex, interdependent systems. As a result, incremental change in one
component creates residual incompatibilities with other components. The effort needed to resolve
these incompatibilities led us to our core notion of imperfect substitutability between the creative
efforts of the principal and the agent.
In this environment of contractual incompleteness, non-appropriability, and imperfect substi-
tutability, what organizational forms can ﬁrms adopt in order to mitigate the incentive problems
that discourage incremental innovation? The answer, we argued, is a variety of organizational
forms, each distinguished by who creates knowledge and who controls it.
Our basic analysis relies on a simple technique illustrated by ﬁgure 2. The ﬁgure shows how
the risk of appropriability and the degree of substitutability together determine which of three
organizational forms will appear. Focussing on substitutability, where substitutability is low the
implementation-form organization appears, that is, the agent neither creates nor controls know-
ledge. Where substitutability is at least moderate, the principal engages the agent in knowledge
creation. If in addition substitutability is sufﬁciently high, then the principal relinquishes control
over how knowledge is used — the agent controls knowledge. We showed how our analysis
explains Sony’s decision to vertically integrate the production of crts. We also showed how
easy it is to extend our analysis in any of several directions by examining Boeing’s decision to
vertically disintegrate its activities. In each case, we clearly identiﬁed the determinants of who
creates knowledge and who controls it.
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